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OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Defendant Albert P. Griggie (“Griggie”) appeals his conviction and sentence for
transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent of engaging in criminal sexual
activity and illicit sexual conduct with that minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) &
(b).  After the District Court denied his pre-trial motion to suppress certain inculpatory
statements given to a Pennsylvania state trooper, Griggie entered a conditional guilty plea. 
As part of the plea, Griggie reserved the right to challenge, and now does so challenge,
the District Court’s denial of his suppression motion.  We will affirm. 
I.
3As the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this case, we
review them only briefly.  On March 13, 2002, Pennsylvania State Trooper Ricky L.
Goodling, investigating the reported sexual assault of a seven year old girl, went to the
location of a parked van in which Griggie, the suspected assailant, was reportedly living. 
Trooper Goodling approached the van and, after running its registration, learned that it
was not validly registered.  He noticed that someone was inside the van and knocked on
one of its doors.  When Griggie stepped outside, Trooper Goodling identified himself as a
state trooper.  Griggie then provided the trooper with a Virginia identification card and
Trooper Goodling informed him that he was investigating complaints of sexual
misconduct that Griggie might be involved in.  
Trooper Goodling then requested, and Griggie consented to, a search of the van. 
During the search, Trooper Goodling observed several specific items that the reported
victim had indicated were used by Griggie in connection with his alleged sexual
misconduct.  Trooper Goodling did not seize any of these items.  
Following the search, Trooper Goodling asked Griggie if he would accompany
him back to the State Police Barracks, which was located one half mile down the road. 
According to Trooper Goodling’s later testimony, he informed Griggie that he was not
under arrest and that he would be free to leave at any time.  Griggie agreed and followed
Trooper Goodling to the barracks in his own van.  When they arrived at the barracks, they
proceeded to the second floor and Trooper Goodling placed Griggie in an interview room
     1There are also several factual issues that are disputed by the parties.  Although
Trooper Goodling testified that he informed Griggie of his Miranda warnings as soon as
he entered the interview room, Griggie contends that he was not told of his Miranda
rights until after he gave an inculpatory statement.  In addition, Griggie testified that
before he gave the inculpatory statement he requested a lawyer.  Trooper Goodling
testified, however, that no such request was made.  The District Court was aware of the
conflicting testimony and its opinion resolved the factual disputes in favor of the
Government.  We find no error in the District Court’s factual findings.
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in the criminal investigation division.
Trooper Goodling and Griggie later gave differing accounts of what took place in
the interview room, but the dispositive facts are uncontroverted.  During the interview,
Trooper Goodling repeated his earlier representation that Griggie was not under arrest and
that he was free to leave regardless of the content of any statement he might give that
night, unless he confessed to a murder.  Griggie responded that if the trooper put that
promise in writing, he would give a statement.  Trooper Goodling then wrote and signed a
note to Griggie stating: “If Albert Griggie tell[s]/admits what happened with touching
Deseree Trowbridge he will be free to leave tonight from PSP HBG [the barracks].”  
After receiving the note, Griggie gave a confession, and then repeated the
confession for tape-recording.  Both parties agree that Griggie was informed of his
Miranda rights and signed a waiver of those rights at 8:30 p.m.  Following his tape-
recorded confession, at 9:45 p.m., Griggie gave oral and written consent to a search of his
van.  During the search, the items that Trooper Goodling had previously observed in the
van were seized.  Griggie was then allowed to leave the barracks in his own van.1
On June 26, 2002, a federal grand jury returned a two-count indictment against
5Griggie.  Count one charged him with crossing a state line to engage in the aggravated
sexual abuse of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c).  Count two charged him with
transporting a minor in interstate commerce with the intent of engaging in criminal sexual
activity and illicit sexual conduct with that minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) &
(b).  Defense counsel thereafter filed a motion to suppress the inculpatory statements
made to Trooper Goodling.  Defense counsel argued that the statements were given
involuntarily and were the product of psychological coercion, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.  A suppression hearing was held on September 26, 2002, at which both
Trooper Goodling and Griggie testified.    
The District Court thereafter issued an order and opinion denying Griggie’s
suppression motion.  The District Court concluded that Griggie had not been in custody
when he made the inculpatory statements to Trooper Goodling because he was not
restrained in any way and told numerous times that he was free to leave.  In any case,
however, the District Court found that Griggie was repeatedly advised of his Miranda
rights and signed a waiver indicating that he understood the right not to give a statement.  
According to the District Court, Griggie’s statements were not the product of police
overreaching, and Trooper Goodling did not mislead Griggie or deprive him of the ability
to make a “free and unconstrained choice about whether or not to make a statement.” 
Accordingly, the Court held that Griggie’s inculpatory statements were made voluntarily.
On November 26, 2002, Griggie entered a conditional guilty plea, under Fed. R.
     2Count one was dismissed on motion of the United States.
     3The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we
have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
     4Griggie also argues that Trooper Goodling subjected him to a custodial interrogation
on the night of March 13, 2002.  He does not, however, contend that his inculpatory
statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  Nor
would such an argument be credible given the District Court’s finding, consistent with
Trooper Goodling’s testimony, that Griggie was repeatedly informed of his Miranda
rights and nonetheless waived those rights.  Rather, his arguments with respect to
custodial interrogation are presented as a component of the voluntariness analysis, and we
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Cr. P. 11(a)(1), to count two of the indictment.2  He was thereafter sentenced to 151
months of incarceration, and he now appeals.3
II.
We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to
the underlying factual findings and we exercise plenary review of the District Court’s
application of the law to those facts.  United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.
2002) (citing United States v. Riddick, 156 F.3d 505, 509 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
Griggie argues on appeal that during his interview with Trooper Goodling, he did
not believe that he was free to leave.  Once a promise of freedom was before him, and for
that reason only, he contends, his ability to make a free and unconstrained choice as to
whether to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was overborne. 
Accordingly, he argues that Trooper Goodling’s promise of freedom rendered his
inculpatory statements involuntary and the District Court therefore erred in denying his
motion to suppress.4  
will therefore construe them as such.
     5Our Fifth Amendment analysis is, of course, also guided by relevant cases applying
the Fourteenth Amendment:
[P]rior to the Supreme Court holding that the [Self-Incrimination Clause of
the] Fifth Amendment applied to the states, it held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bars the admission of “involuntary”
confessions.  See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163, 107 S. Ct. 515,
519 (1986).  “The Court has retained this due process focus, even after
holding, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed.2d 653
(1964), that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination applies to the States.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163,
107 S. Ct. at 519-20 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. at 109-10, 106 S.Ct.
at 449).  Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment due process cases provide the
clearest definition of “voluntariness.”  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 223, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2045-46 (1973) (“The most extensive
judicial exposition of the meaning of ‘voluntariness’ has been developed in
those cases in which the Court has had to determine the ‘voluntariness’ of a
defendant’s confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
Swint, 15 F.3d at 289.
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person
“shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”  U.S. Const.,
amend. V.  In accordance with the Fifth Amendment, “[i]t is clear that ‘only voluntary
confessions may be admitted at the trial of guilt or innocence.’”  United States v. Swint,
15 F.3d 286, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 478 (1972)).5 
This rule applies regardless of whether an interrogation is custodial or noncustodial, see
id. at 289 (citing Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976)), and in either
case, “the government ha[s] the burden of ‘proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that [the defendant’s] . . . confession was voluntarily given.’”  Id. (citing United States ex
rel. Hayward v. Johnson, 508 F.2d 322, 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1011
     6Although Griggie attempts to rely upon the Supreme Court’s statement, in Bram v.
United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897), that in order to be voluntary, a confession
“must not be . . . obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,” both this
Court and the Supreme Court have clearly treated such promises as part of the totality of
the circumstances.  See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) (“[I]t is clear
that this passage from Bram . . . under current precedent does not state the standard for
determining the voluntariness of a confession . . . .”); Miller, 796 F.2d at 608
(“[P]romises do not trigger an analysis different from the totality of the circumstances
test.”); United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 401-02 (4th Cir. 1985).
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(1975)).  
“To determine the voluntariness of a confession, the court must consider the effect
that the totality of the circumstances had upon the will of the defendant.”  Miller v.
Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 226-27 (1973)).  We apply the totality of the circumstances test to a case like this
one, where we must determine the effect of any direct or implied promise upon the
voluntariness of a suspects’s confession.  See id. at 608.6  The potential circumstances to
be considered include: “the length of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the
defendant’s maturity; education; physical condition; and mental health,” and “the failure
of police to advise the defendant of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation.”  Swint, 15 F.3d at 289 (citations omitted).  The crucial
element, however, is that of police coercion.  Id.  According to the Supreme Court,
“coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not
‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause . . . .”  Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).  Such coercive activity includes “trickery, psychological
9pressure, or mistreatment.”  Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708 (1993). 
We have emphasized that the totality of the circumstances approach “is not a but-
for test: we do not ask whether the confession would have been made in the absence of
the interrogation.”  Miller, 796 F.2d at 604.  Rather, we recognize that the police may use
psychological tactics in order to obtain a confession, and the question to be answered
when such tactics are used is whether they “were so manipulative or coercive that they
deprived [the suspect] of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to
confess.”  Id. at 605.  Psychological ploys by the police “may play a part in the suspect’s
decision to confess, but so long as that decision is a product of the suspect’s own
balancing of competing considerations, the confession is voluntary.”  Id.; see also United
States v. Rutledge, 900 F.2d 1127, 1131 (7th Cir.) (“The police are allowed to play on a
suspect’s ignorance, his anxieties, his fears, and his uncertainties; they just are not
allowed to magnify those fears, uncertainties, and so forth to the point where rational
decision becomes impossible.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 875 (1990).   
In the case before us, even assuming that Griggie subjectively believed that he was
not free to leave the barracks on the night in question, and that Trooper Goodling’s
promise was the sole reason for Griggie’s confession, we simply cannot conclude that
Trooper Goodling engaged in coercive activity.  There is no evidence in the record that
Trooper Goodling attempted to deceive or pressure Griggie into giving an inculpatory
statement.  Griggie’s only argument to the contrary is based upon a strained interpretation
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of Trooper Goodling’s written promise.  
Griggie argues that the written promise – “[i]f Albert Griggie tell[s]/admits what
happened with touching Deseree Trowbridge he will be free to leave tonight from [the
barracks]” – makes clear by implication that Griggie was free to leave that night only if he
gave an inculpatory statement.  We disagree.  Such an interpretation is supported neither
by logic nor by a reading of the written promise in conjunction with Trooper Goodling’s
oral representations to Griggie.  
The statement embodied in the written promise, and its inverse, are not logical
equivalents.  That is, the promise cannot be read logically to mean that, if Griggie refused
to give a statement, he would not be free to leave that night.  Nor, we believe, can such a
reading reasonably be implied given Trooper Goodling’s testimony, and the District
Court’s finding, that Griggie was repeatedly informed that he was not under arrest, that he
was free to leave at any time, and that he would continue to be free to leave that night no
matter what he told Trooper Goodling (unless he implicated himself in a murder).  
The import of the written promise, when read together with Trooper Goodling’s
oral representations, was that Griggie could have given a statement that was not
inculpatory, or no statement at all, and he nonetheless would have been free to leave that
night.  Accordingly, we conclude that the decision to confess rather than give a non-
inculpatory statement was left entirely within Griggie’s discretion.  We therefore hold that
Trooper Goodling’s conduct was not coercive.
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Other factors to be considered under the totality of the circumstances test also
counsel against any conclusion that Griggie’s inculpatory statements were made
involuntarily.  The interview itself was of relatively short duration, lasting approximately
one hour and fifteen minutes from the beginning of the interview to the completion of
Griggie’s tape-recorded confession.  During the interview, Griggie was not subjected to
any threats or physical deprivation.  Not only was he informed of his right to remain silent
and his right to counsel, but he also signed a form acknowledging his understanding, and
waiver, of those rights.  Accordingly, he understood that any inculpatory statement could
be used against him.  Griggie himself, although possessing only a seventh-grade
education, was fifty-two years of age and had no history of mental illness.  He was
previously enlisted in the military and also had previous experiences in the criminal
justice system.  In short, there is no indication that, under the totality of the
circumstances, Griggie was unable to make an intelligent choice between giving an
inculpatory statement, a non-inculpatory statement, or simply no statement at all.  
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
